Recently, the paper When Should Firms Facilitate Consumer Learning? An Experimental Study by Professor Zhang Lan from the School of Economics, Shandong University, was published online in Games and Economic Behavior on October 29, 2026. Her co-authors are Eric Schmidbauer from the University of Central Florida and Brock Stoddard from Appalachian State University.
Consumers frequently face information asymmetry in routine transactions. In such settings, as the controller of information, firms may facilitate or limit consumer learning about the value of a transaction through advertising, product demonstrations and other approaches, thereby shaping transaction outcomes.
This experimental study investigates when firms are willing to supply information so that consumers can learn their own valuations of the product. In the experiment, firms make take-it-or-leave-it offers to consumers who are uncertain about their valuations, and may choose whether to enable consumer learning, without observing what consumers learn. The theoretical prediction is that firms are more inclined to provide information when ex ante transaction gains are low, especially when marginal costs are high, to screen high-valuation consumers; by contrast, low-cost firms tend to suppress learning and pursue broad sales. The experimental results generally align with this prediction, yet with notable deviations: consumers exhibit lower acceptance rates when firms deliberately choose not to enable learning, even if this choice conveys no valuation information; firms that allow learning set higher prices; low-cost firms supply information excessively relative to theoretical benchmarks, while high-cost firms supply insufficient information. Consumers’ negative responses to deliberate non-disclosure affect firms’ pricing and information provision.
This research revises the theoretical assumption of consumer rationality to some extent. It offers implications for designing free trials, product previews and demonstrations on digital platforms and for subscription goods, as well as for formulating corporate transparency policies, product information disclosure rules and marketing strategies such as “no trial” or information withholding.
Zhang Lan Professor and Doctoral Supervisor at the School of Economics, Shandong University. She holds a Ph.D. in Business Economics from the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, USA. Her research interests include industrial organization theory and information economics. Her work has appeared in journals including China Economic Quarterly, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Industrial Economics, International Journal of Industrial Organization, and Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.