Topic:

(Strong)Implementability with Transfer

Abstract:

We fully characterize (strong) implementability with transfer, without invoking quasilinearity, via a novel cyclical monotonicity condition that extends Rochet(1987). We then apply it to crack the problem ofimplementingmonotone allocations forthegeneral caseunder the assumption of the possibility of compensation:(i) the single-crossing condition, when type space is totally ordered and outcome space is partially ordered,is sufficient and necessary for strongly implementing all monotone allocation;and (ii) with the strictsingle-crossing condition and totally ordered type space and outcome space, an allocation is implementable if and only if it is monotone. No additional structure or recularity conditions are needed. Applications are discussed.

Lecturer:Jianrong Tian

Jianrong Tian , PhD graduated from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, is now a visiting scholar at the National School of Development, Peking University. His research interests include game theory and microeconomics. His research has been published in fivemajor journals, Review of Economic Studies, and only published in the A-class journals Journal of Economic Theory and Economic Journal.

Time: April 11 ,2024 16:00-18:00

Venue: B336,Zhixin Building,CentralCampus