Topic: Rationalizable Stability in Matching with One-SidedIncomplete Information

Lecturer: Assitant Prof. Ziwei WANG, Wuhan University

Time:14:00-15:30 p.m. April 21st,2023 (Fri.)

Venue: B336, Zhixin Building, Central Campus

Abstract:This paper proposes a new notion of stability to studymatching markets with one-sided incomplete information.A key contribution is to formulate a proper definition ofuninformed agents' endogenous beliefs and a self consistency condition on those beliefs. We define a criterion ofstability for a given set of outcomes, and then iterativelyapply this criterion to remove outcomes that cannot bedeemed stable. Our solution concept, the set of rationalizable stable outcomes, is the limit of this procedure. Weprove the existence of rationalizable stable outcomesusing a fixed-point characterization. We then provide twoadditional characterizations of our solution concept. Thefirst characterization links the non-equilibrium approachwe pursue to the equilibrium approach pioneered by Liu(2020). The second one reveals the epistemic assumptionsimplicit in the iterative definition.