Events

Advanced Economic Seminars 168: Heterogeneity and Unanimity: Optimal Committees with Information Acquisition

Publisher: Time:2016-12-26 16:09:00

Topic: Heterogeneity and Unanimity: Optimal Committees with Information Acquisition

Lecturer:ZHAO Xin, University of Technology, Sydney, Australia

Time: 03:15pm-05:00pm, Dec.29(Thur),  2016

Venue: B423, Zhixin Building

Abstract: This paper studies how the composition and voting rule of a decision-making committee affect the incentives for its members to acquire information. Fixing the voting rule, a more polarized committee acquires more information. If a committee designer can choose the committee members and voting rule to maximize her payoff from the collective decision, she forms a heterogeneous committee adopting a unanimous rule, in which one member moderately biased toward one decision serves as the decisive voter, and all others are extremely opposed to the decisive voter and serve as information providers. The preference of the decisive voter is not perfectly aligned with that of the designer.