Advanced Economic Seminars 159:Analytical Cooperative Games

Publisher: Time:2016-11-14 11:13:00

Topic: Analytical Cooperative Games

Lecturer:CAO Zhigang,Chinese Academy of Sciences

Time: 03:30pm-05:00pm, Nov.17(Thur),  2016

Venue: B321, Zhixin Building

Abstract: We provide a general framework for analyzing resources pooling games. We focus on nice cooperative functions, which derive balanced games for all possible endowments. We show that a cooperative function is nice if and only if a modified Aubin core (a.k.a. a linear core, set of Owen points or shadow prices) of the cooperative function is nonempty at each point. We also characterize concave nice cooperative functions and convex ones and study when a cooperative function always derives a convex game. Applications of this framework include coupon exchange games, linear production games and newsvendor games etc. In particular, compared with the well-known fact that the dual-optimal solution set is in general a proper subset of the core of a linear production game, the Aubin core of a linear production game always equals the dual-optimal solution set. The Aubin core of a nice cooperative function is also closely related to superdifferential, implying that powerful analytical tools are useful in this framework.